February 6, 2026
4 mins read

ISIS Finds New Life Online in Southeast Asia

After IS’s territorial collapse, militants shifted to cyber-based strategies, using Southeast Asia’s social media reach to spread propaganda, raise funds and organise….writes  Dr. Rahul Mishra and Prisie L. Patnayak

Online radicalisation by ISIS and its affiliates is an escalating threat in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Strong internet penetration and widespread social media use amplify the risk, allowing radical ideologies to spread rapidly. This increasing digital threat poses significant security challenges for countries in the region.

Building on this, the ‘Southeast Asia angle’ in the Bondi Beach shooting in Australia points towards the worrying trend of localised radicalisation with regional linkages, connected at the wider level with Islamic State (IS) in the post-caliphate era.

Investigators revealed that the two attackers involved in the Bondi Beach incident visited Mindanao, Philippines, before the attack, a region in the Philippines which has a history of Islamic insurgency movements. While the Filipino officials debunked any indication that the two received training in Mindanao, the Bondi incident is a grim sign of the presence of IS and radical elements in Southeast Asia.

The Bondi case demonstrates a defining feature of the post-caliphate era: lone wolves radicalised online. This self-reinforcing phenomenon is prominent in Southeast Asia. While organised terror groups have weakened, and major attacks have declined, the threat has shifted to online platforms. 

After IS’s territorial collapse, individuals have adopted cyber-based strategies. With high reliance on social media in Southeast Asia, terrorist groups use these platforms to spread propaganda, raise funds, and organise. Encrypted messaging apps like Telegram and WhatsApp aid communication among extremists. Meme formats, commentary reels, and local languages help propaganda reach a wider audience. 

As per media reports, 54% of the cases in Malaysia involve support to Islamic State (ISIS) members via internet platforms. ISIS-K, formally known as Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISKP), an IS affiliate operating primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan and Central Asian regions, have used Malaysia’s digital domain to disseminate radical ideology throughout Southeast Asia. In Indonesia alone, the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) recorded over 180,000 pieces of extremist content circulating online throughout 2024. 

Such tactics are not limited to individual actors; pro-IS media networks, such as the At-Tamkin Malay Media Foundation, have emerged. They use digital channels to incite violence and recruit supporters. In February 2024, the Al-Aan Foundation made a recruitment video. The video openly called on Malaysians to migrate and to ‘rise up’ for oppressed Muslims. In Indonesia, around 181 terror-linked non-profit organisations are known to channel money to these groups.

Global events like Israel’s war in Gaza fuel extremist narratives in Southeast Asia. Large Muslim populations may feel connected, blurring the line between advocacy and extremism. Groups like ISIS exploit these events online, targeting youths as young as 12 using platforms such as TikTok and Facebook.

Amplifying these influences, algorithms on internet platforms further spread radical content, forming an environment in which such messages can be absorbed passively. This has led to self-radicalisation, giving birth to ‘lone wolf actors.’ These actors carry out political violence without direct support or instruction from an established terrorist network.

Self-radicalisation is a main driver of the terror threat in Southeast Asia. From 2013 to 2022, Indonesian courts dealt with 721 terrorism-related cases, with 360 involving individuals radicalised through digital platforms. In Singapore, 17 youths have been dealt with under the Internal Security Act (ISA) in the past decade, with two-thirds of them detected in just the past five years, most of them radicalised online. 

Given these complexities, one challenge in countering online radicalisation is the unclear line between consuming extremist content and committing violence. In 2024, Indonesian authorities arrested seven people during the Pope’s visit. Two-faced terrorism charges for planning an attack. Others were linked to online radical discourse without direct violent involvement.

This shows that extremist rhetoric online may not pose an immediate threat, but its influence is still dangerous. In the Bondi shooting, the radicalisation process took nearly seven years. Naveed Akram, one of the shooters, was first exposed to extremist content at 17, but acted only at 24.

Ultimately, the Bondi Beach incident and the spread of digital radicalisation across Southeast Asia blur the boundaries between local, regional, and global security. These trends highlight the need for deeper regional and international collaboration. Governments should focus not just on known extremists but also on patterns of online behaviour and long-term radicalisation.

Digital awareness and ethics programmes are important in disrupting the path to radicalisation. Governments should work with technology companies to remove extremist material and to address algorithm issues. ASEAN can play a key role in coordinating regional efforts. The Manila Declaration to Counter the Rise of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism highlights regional cooperation, capacity-building, and sharing best practices. Southeast Asian countries—through ASEAN or individually—can also work with neighbours like Australia and India through intelligence sharing.

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