The submarine officially entered the repair phase, known as Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA), in February 2023…reports Asian Lite News
Nearly five years after a high-profile collision in the South China Sea, the USS Connecticut, one of the U.S. Navy’s most advanced submarines, is now expected to return to service only by late 2026. The Seawolf-class nuclear-powered attack submarine has been undergoing extensive repairs following the 2021 accident that left it severely damaged.
According to The Eurasian Times, the Connecticut collided with an uncharted underwater seamount on October 2, 2021, while on a classified mission in the northern South China Sea. The impact damaged the submarine’s bow, sonar dome, and several critical underside components. Despite the severity of the incident, the crew managed to safely surface the vessel and navigate it to Guam. From there, the sub was transported to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington State for major repairs.
The submarine officially entered the repair phase, known as Extended Docking Selected Restricted Availability (EDSRA), in February 2023. The process was initially slated to take 31 months, aiming for completion by September 2025. However, multiple setbacks — including dock infrastructure upgrades, shipyard backlogs, and a lack of readily available spare parts — have now pushed the expected return date to the end of 2026.
One of the most critical challenges stems from the Connecticut’s classification. The Seawolf class is extremely rare, with only three submarines ever built. This limited production run has made sourcing parts like bow domes exceptionally difficult, as such components require years to manufacture due to their specialized nature.
“The USS Connecticut’s repair timeline highlights a deeper issue — the Navy’s limited surge capacity for critical repairs,” said Diana Maurer of the U.S. Government Accountability Office. “It raises real concerns about the Navy’s ability to conduct battle damage repairs during an actual conflict,” she added.
Further complicating matters, the submarine’s entry into dry dock was delayed until July 2023 due to seismic strengthening work at the Puget Sound facility. These infrastructure challenges have added months to the timeline, reflecting broader concerns about the resilience and readiness of America’s naval repair infrastructure.
Cost estimates for the repairs have also grown. Congress initially allocated $50 million in 2021 for emergency repairs and a new bow dome. However, reports cited by The Eurasian Times and Bloomberg suggest the total repair cost could reach $80 million.
The Connecticut’s prolonged absence has left a noticeable gap in the Navy’s underwater strike capabilities, especially at a time when strategic tensions are escalating in the Indo-Pacific. The Seawolf-class submarines are prized for their speed, stealth, and weapons-carrying capacity — all vital attributes in contested waters.
The delay also draws attention to the slow progress of the SSN(X) program, which aims to develop the next generation of nuclear-powered attack submarines. That program has now been pushed into the 2040s, making the restoration of the Connecticut even more urgent to maintain strategic balance.
With another 18 months or more of repair work ahead, the Navy’s focus remains on returning the Connecticut to active duty — but the episode has left lasting questions about preparedness, infrastructure, and naval resilience in an increasingly uncertain global climate.
US Blocks China Cables
In a decisive move to counter China’s growing footprint in global internet infrastructure, the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has announced plans to block the use of Chinese technology or corporate involvement in any future undersea communication cables that connect to the US. The proposal marks a significant escalation in the technological and geopolitical rivalry between Washington and Beijing, as reported by Taipei Times.
“Foreign adversaries, especially China, have posed threats to submarine cable infrastructure in recent years,” FCC Chair Brendan Carr stated. “Consequently, we are taking measures to protect our submarine cables from ownership and access by foreign adversaries, as well as from cyber and physical threats.”
Submarine cables are the backbone of the modern internet, carrying more than 99 percent of global data traffic. With more than 400 such cables weaving across the ocean floors, the threat of compromise—whether through espionage, surveillance, or sabotage—is seen as a growing national security concern by US officials.
The new regulations will formalise and expand upon restrictions already in place. Since 2020, the FCC and other US regulators have rejected at least four proposed undersea cable projects linking the US and Hong Kong. These rejections were based on mounting fears that Chinese access could enable data interception or disruption, particularly given the increasing alignment between Chinese corporations and state interests.
The FCC’s proposal will prohibit the involvement of companies that appear on the US national security threat list. That list currently includes major Chinese telecom and technology firms such as Huawei, ZTE, China Telecom, and China Mobile. These firms have long been accused by Washington of facilitating surveillance on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party—a charge they deny.
Beyond blocking future cable projects, the FCC will also solicit public feedback on additional measures to secure existing undersea infrastructure. This includes protecting cables from foreign adversary interference—both cyber and physical—and enhancing transparency around ownership and management.
The move comes amid a series of incidents that underscore the vulnerability of undersea cables. In 2023, Taiwan accused Chinese vessels of intentionally severing internet cables servicing the Matsu Islands, cutting off the region’s access for several weeks. In early 2024, three major cables in the Red Sea were damaged in what many suspect was deliberate sabotage. Investigations are also ongoing into unexplained damage to cables in the Baltic Sea—an area with growing military and intelligence interest.
These events have fed into a broader narrative of concern among Western nations that Beijing is attempting to “weaponise” infrastructure. Critics argue that by embedding Chinese hardware into essential systems, China is creating opportunities for surveillance, data exfiltration, and strategic control. Such risks are especially high in undersea cables, which carry sensitive financial, government, and military data across continents.
The US isn’t acting alone. Similar concerns have prompted governments in Australia, Japan, and the European Union to scrutinise or block Chinese-linked cable projects. Japan recently committed to boosting its domestic production of undersea cable components, while the EU has opened discussions on creating a more secure pan-European cable strategy.
China, for its part, has pushed back against such moves, accusing the US of hypocrisy and technological protectionism. Beijing maintains that its firms operate independently and that the West is using cybersecurity as a pretext to suppress Chinese competitiveness.
However, US officials say the stakes are too high to ignore. “Submarine cables are not just communication tools—they’re critical infrastructure,” said Carr. “We cannot afford to allow potential adversaries access to the circulatory system of the global internet.”
As tensions between the two global superpowers play out beneath the ocean surface, Washington’s strategy signals a hardening position: Chinese influence over international data flow will no longer go unchallenged. The FCC’s actions represent not just a technological safeguard, but a broader shift in how the US views digital infrastructure in the era of strategic competition.
