August 8, 2023
4 mins read

Peking Snubs Pakistan

Pakistan has little to rejoice after the visit of Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng. Pakistan government’s declining capability and credibility in tackling internal security challenges is not reassuring for Chinese leadership. Signing of six minor deals in major areas of cooperation indicates China’s preference of remaining in game while being cautious at the same time

For some years now, Pakistan is seen braving many setbacks in its bilateral cooperation with China. Expecting much-needed impetus through the long-awaited visit to the country by Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Pakistani government continued updating its wish list. First announced in 2020, the high-profile visit kept on getting postponed on different pretexts since then. Finally, China granted a visit to Pakistan when its Vice Premier He Lifeng visited the country from July 30 to Aug 01, 2023.

Despite being ridiculed in domestic media, the government remained hopeful of the long-term impact of the visit on strategic ties with China. However, the outcomes of the ‘high-profile’ visit appear far off from strategic or long-term. Most of Pakistan’s expectations were tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which is considered the symbol of iron brotherly ties between the two countries. However, the clouds of security concerns and lack of political clarity proved to be too dark for increasing the cooperation in a meaningful manner. The absence of movement on various projects under CPEC over the last few years clearly indicates the effect of these two factors on expanding the sphere of cooperation.

Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng, the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, attends the Decade of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) celebration event in Islamabad, Pakistan. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

During the visit, He Lifeng held some important meetings with Pakistani leadership including Pak Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, President Arif Alvi, the Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, Minister for Finance Ishaq Dar and Planning Minister Ahsan Iqbal. Apart from that, he also attended events commemorating a ‘Decade of CPEC’ and a ‘PLA Founding Day’ event at Pak Army Headquarters at Rawalpindi. Shehbaz Sharif thanked the Chinese leader for the recent Chinese financial help, which came at a very crucial time. However, a glimpse into the list of agreements signed during the visit does not look as if the iron brother ties have taken any leap. Overall, the two countries signed six pacts to enhance cooperation in diverse fields. These included agreements on joint cooperation committee of CPEC, the establishment of an expert exchange mechanism within CPEC, the upgradation of ML-1 railways, a feasibility study for realignment of the Karakoram Highway Phase II, MoU on the Industrial Workers’ Exchange Programme through diplomatic channels and export of dried chillies from Pakistan to China. The nature of these deals cannot be considered to be adding significant strategic value to the bilateral cooperation.  

Moreover, the Pakistani government’s declining capability and credibility in tackling internal security challenges is not reassuring for the Chinese leadership. Signing only basic deals in major areas of cooperation indicates China’s preference for remaining in the game while being cautious at the same time. Beijing’s inclination in increasing the scope and speed of implementation will be clear only once the new regime takes over in Islamabad after a few months. Meanwhile, China is expected to keep on pressuring the Pak government regarding the safety of its nationals and assets, which have been repeatedly targeted by the insurgents.

Pakistani President Arif Alvi meets with Chinese Vice Premier He Lifeng (C), the special representative of Chinese President Xi Jinping, in Islamabad, Pakistan. (Xinhua/Ahmad Kamal)

Apart from the volatile security situation in Pakistan, the precarious economic situation here is leading to lowering Chinese faith in the country’s capacity to deliver. While Beijing continues to step in to avert possible debt defaults by Pakistan, the helping hand appears to be increasingly reluctant. The recent rollout of $2.4 billion support by China amid the economic crisis in Pakistan came after a lot of wavering. The ever-ballooning circular debt is also not helping further investments in the power sector of CPEC. The experiences of Chinese Independent Power Producers (IPPs) in getting their dues clear in Pakistan is making the new investors wary about fresh investments. The intentional inadequacy in deliverables of the latest visit by the Chinese Vice Premier may be seen as a symptom of this wariness.

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Pakistan Risks Overstretching Itself in Yemen War

Pakistan’s expanding military role in Saudi Arabia amid the Yemen conflict could strain its defence resources and fragile finances…reports Asian Lite News Desk Pakistan’s military involvement in the war in Yemen may prove unsustainable because of mounting financial pressures and competing security demands, according to a new report. Islamabad’s growing military presence in Saudi Arabia risks stretching its defence resources while exposing the country to greater strategic and economic challenges. An article by Andrew Wilson in One World Outlook describes Pakistan’s involvement as a case of “fiscal and strategic overreach”, arguing that the country lacks the financial flexibility to sustain an expanded military commitment. Pakistan’s external finances depend heavily on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, financial support from Gulf countries and remittances from Pakistani workers in the region. The report argues that deeper military involvement in the conflict could place additional pressure on these sources of financial stability. It also warns that deploying troops and military equipment abroad could weaken Pakistan’s capacity to address security challenges along its eastern border and deal with two domestic insurgencies. The move could also draw Islamabad into a conflict it has sought to approach cautiously. A Reuters report in May, citing Pakistani security and government sources, said Islamabad had deployed around 8,000 troops, a squadron of approximately 16 aircraft, mostly JF-17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons and a Chinese HQ-9 air-defence battery to Saudi Arabia. According to those sources, Riyadh was financing the deployment, with Pakistani personnel operating the equipment. The sources also said a confidential agreement contemplated the possibility of deploying up to 80,000 troops. Islamabad has not confirmed those figures, although it has acknowledged its military presence in Saudi Arabia, including the deployment of fighter jets at King Abdulaziz Air Base from April. The One World Outlook article argues that Saudi financial support can cover allowances and operating expenses but cannot easily replace military equipment needed elsewhere or resolve the political and strategic challenges of participating in the Yemen conflict. Pakistan’s defence budget is another concern. For the 2026-27 financial year, the federal government allocated PKR 3 trillion, or approximately $10.8 billion, to defence services. The allocation represents an 18 per cent increase from the original PKR 2.55 trillion provision and amounts to around 2.1 per cent of projected gross domestic product (GDP). Defence spending accounts for approximately 16 per cent of the federal government’s PKR 18.8 trillion expenditure. Military pensions are budgeted separately at PKR 822 billion, while debt servicing costs stand at approximately PKR 8 trillion, more than two-and-a-half times the defence allocation. The report argues that these competing financial obligations leave little room for additional military expenditure without placing further pressure on public finances. Pakistan’s reliance on IMF assistance also limits its fiscal flexibility. The country must meet the conditions attached to the programme, including a primary budget surplus target of 2 per cent of GDP and continued restraint on development spending. According to the article, these requirements make it difficult for Islamabad to finance an additional military commitment without compromising other budgetary priorities. Pakistan’s economic indicators offer limited reassurance. Economic growth for the 2025-26 financial year is estimated at between 3.6 and 3.7 per cent, while inflation reached approximately 10.3 per cent in September following an energy price shock. Foreign exchange reserves stood at around $21.5 billion at the end of September. Although this marks an improvement from the low levels recorded in 2023, the report notes that the reserves cover only a few months of imports. Financial assistance from Gulf partners remains central to Pakistan’s external stability. The article says Islamabad holds approximately $8 billion in Saudi deposits at its central bank. In July, the State Bank of Pakistan said Riyadh had extended the maturity of $5 billion in deposits to December 2028, easing the country’s immediate external financing requirements. A further $3 billion deposit was also extended in the spring. However, the article argues that these arrangements provide temporary relief rather than long-term financial independence, particularly as regional conflict threatens the stability of the Gulf economies on which Pakistan relies. The report concludes that Pakistan faces a difficult balance between supporting Saudi Arabia militarily and preserving the financial and military resources needed to address its domestic and regional challenges.

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Nepal Floods Cause $1.66 Billion In Damage, Says World Bank

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