February 6, 2026
5 mins read

Fundamentalists fracture in Bangladesh

With Jamaat and Charmonai followers falling apart, fundamentalist Islamic parties are now a divided house in Bangladesh, writes Arif Islam

With the Islami Andolan Bangladesh deserting the alliance of Islamic parties floated by Jamaat-e-Islami for the ensuing National Parliamentary Elections in the country, the plan of the Islamist fraternity to take on the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in a straight contest has received a setback.

Indeed, now it is a fight between the giants among them; with Jamaat being the largest Islamic political party of Bangladesh and Islami Andolan too enjoying a huge support base in the country. The smaller Islamist parties are split into rival camps now.

On the face of it, the difference between IAB and Jamaat is over the seat-sharing arrangement for the polls. The Jamaat formula of leaving for it only 47 seats to contest in a total of 300 is unacceptable to the IAB which has announced that it will contest 268 seats independently. But, IAB and Jamaat, two of the strongest Islamist parties with an active role in politics in Bangladesh, have other fundamental differences. These underscore the difficulties in the way of the plan of fundamentalist parties to turn Bangladesh into an Islamist country.

There are ideological differences between the two, Jamaat being followers of the Mawdudi school of Islam while IAB belonging to the Deobandi school. The two schools are traditionally unacceptable to each other. But there are more down-to-earth reasons as to why it is difficult for IAB and Jamaat to see eye-to-eye. IAB, belonging to the fold of the Charmonai Madrasa of Barisal, has its roots in the soil of Bangladesh; while Jamaat-e-Islami has its origin in Pakistan. Charmonai Madrasa played an active and important role in the liberation struggle of Bangladesh in 1971 while Jamaat was a collaborator of the occupation forces of Pakistan during the genocide of the Bengali people.

The joint plan of Jamaat and IAB, forged exactly a year ago, to turn Bangladesh into an Islamic country now lies in tatters. “Bangladesh is ours,” Jamaat-e-Islami Ameer Shafiqur Rahman announced on January 22, 2025, in a joint news conference with IAB Ameer and Charmonai Pir Mufti Syed Mohammed Rezaul Karim, stressing the need for all Islamist parties in the country to unite to avoid a division of votes. “Out of the 180 million people in the country, 91 percent feel comfortable identifying themselves as Muslims. Among the rest nine percent, there may be some followers of different religions and some atheists.”

On January 16, 2026, however, IAB leader Gazi Ataur Rahman told reporters that his party had decided to quit the 11-party alliance led by Jamaat after being “deprived of justice” regarding seat allocations. He announced that the IAB would contest 268 of the 300 seats. A day earlier, a meeting of the Jamaat-led grand alliance decided that Jamaat would contest 179 seats and the student-led National Citizen Party 30; leaving 47 seats vacant for Islami Andolan, which boycotted the meeting. The dream of the Jamaat Ameer of unity of Islamic parties so there is “no more any farcical elections” has thus evaporated.

Reconciliation between Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh and Islami Andolan Bangladesh is difficult. Jamaat being followers of the Mawdudi line, often described as modern political Islam, had played its card well in the past to consolidate its position in Bangladesh; having been a partner in the ruling BNP-led coalition from 2001 to 2006. Founded in Lahore during the British era and rooted in Pakistan, Jamaat has played the game of Pakistan in Bangladesh too. Several Jamaat leaders have been tried and sentenced for taking part in the genocide during the liberation struggle of Bangladesh. Even now, Jamaat is promoting the game plan of Pakistan of turning Bangladesh into a theocratic Islamic state. “We want to follow the law of Allah completely. Our gathering is for Allah. This gathering will also be in the field of politics,” the Jamaat Amir announced on January 22, 2025.

Being adherents of the Deobandi line, IAB are followers of traditional Islam and would also like to see Bangladesh turn into an Islamic state. But, being followers of Charmonai Madrasa, they would not like to see Bangladesh turn again into a colony of Pakistan. During the nine-month-long liberation struggle, Charmonai Madrasa had been a sanctuary for ‘mukti fauz’ of Bangladesh. Members of the liberation army would store arms and food in the madrasah, take rest and carry out consultation. The madrasa management had vacated three rooms in their premises for the use of the freedom fighters.

Recent opinion polls in Bangladesh have suggested that Jamaat-e-Islami will finish a close second to the BNP in the elections slated in February. Being more astute politicians, Jamaat leaders are already in touch with BNP leaders on the possibility of forming a BNP-Jamaat alliance government. This, too, has not been liked by the IAB which, in that case, would be left high and dry.

Now there will thus be a three-way division of votes for fundamentalist Islamic parties in the Bangladesh election. The Jamaat -led alliance brings together five Islamist parties, three of which are rooted in Qawmi madrasa traditions; among them Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis, Khelafat Majlis and Bangladesh Khilafat Andolan. There are three fundamentalist Islamist parties of Qawmi traditions in the BNP-led alliance too, among them Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam Bangladesh and islami Oikya Jote. The third force in the fray is the IAB, belonging to the Charmonai tradition.

Qawmi madrasas which are private madrasas are usually the main seats of teaching of fundamentalist Islam. The votes of this school are going to be divided in three camps in the coming polls; with unity eluding the fundamentalists. It is difficult for Jamaat to unite all the Qawmi madrasa parties under its umbrella as Hefazat-e-Islam, an important Deobandi advocacy group, does not support Jamaat.

It is of course a strong point of Jamaat that the National Citizen Party, formed by Student Against Discrimination which had launched the agitation in July 2024 for the removal of Sheikh Hasina from power, has aligned with them. Post-election, thus, in a repetition of the political scene in Bangladesh between 2001 and 2006, a coalition government of BNP and Jamaat and the sundry parties in the Jamaat-led alliance, is a likely scenario. 

Newsdesk

Newsdesk

Aravind Rajeev is Deputy News Editor at Asian Lite, mostly covering the Middle East and GCC. He has over eight years of experience as a journalist, with a background in ground-level reporting, crime reporting, as well as international and regional news.

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