December 7, 2020
7 mins read

Khalistani Support For Protest A Poisoned Chalice

An informed observer pointed out the rally was led by Sikhs For Justice (SFJ), a US-based secessionist group with a presence in the British capital, and Babbar Khalsa, both proscribed in India. Both are suspected to have links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) …. Writes Ashis Ray from London

Ashis Ray

The massive Indian farmers’ movement against the Narendra Modi government’s recent Farm Acts, which among commissions and omissions, do not provide a minimum support price (MSP) guarantee for agricultural products, has elicited enormous awe and respect among Indians. Indeed, while the agitation is spearheaded by tillers of the soil in Punjab – the granary of India – it has spread to other states.

The assembly of protestors at arterial entry points to Delhi represent Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh and stretch to hundreds of thousands of disgruntled men and women. One tailback of tractors and trucks was as long as 13 kilometres. But the farmers need to be wary of elements inimical to India hijacking their campaign and thereby bringing discredit to it.

They must immediately distance themselves from Khalistani organisations outside India who are attempting to identify with the demonstration to garner support among Indian Sikhs. What is essentially a nationalist struggle – for it is about livelihoods of agriculturalists who provide food to all Indians – if tainted by acceptance of support from separatists – will dilute the sympathy it has so far attracted from the Indian masses. Their opponents will be quick to divide the farmers on the issue. 

Anti-India activists protest near Indian High Commission in London

Canada is a G7 country. When the prime minister of such a nation wades into India’s internal affairs – as Justin Trudeau has now twice done – you wonder what could be behind it. This is not the first time the Canadian establishment has disappointed Indians. Their failure to bring to justice perpetrators of the terrorist bombing of Air India’s Kanishka left a bitter taste in the mouth. But Ottawa does not habitually behave irresponsibly; and there has been close cooperation with Delhi as well.

Canadian Sikhs, who mostly hail from Punjab, constitute a vote bank in the country’s politics. Economically, they punch above their weight; and a majority of Sikh MPs are in Trudeau’s Liberal Party. But a section of them subscribe to a homeland for Sikhs carved out of India; and this element has opportunistically jumped in to identify with the farmers’ confrontation with the Indian central government. It’s none of their business, for they are Canadian nationals, but that’s the way it is.

In an online address on 30 November to mark Sikhism’s founder Guru Nanak’s birth anniversary, Trudeau said: “Canada will always be there to defend the right of peaceful protest.”

This was clearly in the context of police in India employing teargas, water cannons and lathis to counter Punjabi, mainly Sikh farmers’ caravan to Delhi. Now jammers are allegedly being used to deny them access to electronic communication networks. 

Unsurprisingly, the spokesman for India’s Ministry of External Affairs pounced on Trudeau’s remarks, calling them ill-informed and unwarranted.  The fact that there’s no love lost between Modi and Trudeau hasn’t helped. It’s a moot point whether petulance or constructive engagement should be the Indian External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar’s response. 

Protest near India House in London (Image from Twitter)

Normally the MEA’s reaction would have been justified. However, after Modi himself incredibly interfered in the United States’ presidential election with a high profile endorsement of Donald Trump, his government may have forfeited its right to object to a foreign power complaining about democratic principles being compromised in India.

Canada, like western Europe, has called out China on its crackdown on non-violent pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong.

Which brings us to Britain. Tanmanjit Singh Dhesi is the first and one of two Sikh MPs in Britain. He with 35 other lawmakers in the House of Commons shot off a letter to the British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab, seeking an urgent meeting and asking him to make a representation to Jaishankar on the issue.

Dhesi claimed in his communication, “92% of UK Sikhs have ties with agricultural land in India”. This may well be true. But his source was Sikh Council UK. This body was ravaged by mass resignations last year on grounds of it coming under the influence of Sikh Federation UK (SFUK), a marked Khalistani organisation and successor to International Sikh Youth Federation, which was banned for some time by the British government.

Notably, the other Sikh MP, Preet Kaur Gill, was missing among the signatories to the letter, perhaps because she is now a shadow spokeswoman for the opposition Labour party. She tweeted though to say: “The right to peacefully protest is our democratic right. I come from a family of farmers (in Punjab)…No one wants to see violence used against peaceful protesters.” This was re-tweeted by SFUK.

Protest near India House in London (Image from Twitter)

Both Dhesi and Gill have Sikh voters in their Slough and Birmingham Edgbaston constituencies. The former hails from Gravesend, an area with a history of Khalistani hardliners. The latter is chair of the All Party Parliamentary Group for British Sikhs, which in tandem with SFUK approached the British Office of National Statistics (ONS) to list Sikhs as an ethnic group separate from Indians. The two accompanied Dabinderjit Singh Sidhu – known to be a militant Khalistani – to submit the petition to the ONS, which of course rejected the request. Sidhu was filmed at a gurdwara in Leicester advocating violence to establish an independent Sikh state of Khalistan.

All except seven of the MPs who wrote to Raab belong to Labour, including its former leader and deputy leader Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell, both left extremists with softness for the Khalistani cause. The party under the new stewardship of Keir Starmer is unlikely to be likewise supportive.

Dhesi’s missive was signed by four MPs of Pakistani origin. One of them – Afzal Khan is vice-president of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Kashmir, canvasses support from British parliamentarians, highlights abuses of human rights in Indian-controlled Kashmir and supports self-determination there. 

SFUK went to town on Twitter on 6 December posting photos and videos of what they proclaimed was a “siege of the Indian High Commission in London in support of farmers peacefully protesting in Delhi”. Ignoring COVID19 restrictions, about 4000 gathered in front of the mission, which was barricaded by London’s police. They descended from as far as the West Midlands of England to billow black and yellow smoke as they stood with placards before the diplomatic premises. News agency Press Association reported 13 protesters were arrested. Scotland Yard had urged the demonstrators to reconsider, but this went unheeded.

Tanmanjeet Singh Dhesi MP

An informed observer pointed out the rally was led by Sikhs For Justice (SFJ), a US-based secessionist group with a presence in the British capital, and Babbar Khalsa, both proscribed in India. Both are suspected to have links with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Dhesi was careful not to play up the scene outside India House. But his politics borders on endorsing Sikh separatism in Indian Punjab. Consequently, the legitimacy of his appeal is coloured by this fissiparous tendency. Besides, as a UK citizen – regardless of representing British families who are related to Punjabi farmers – he has arguably little locus standi to accuse India of “failing to protect farmers from exploitation” – as asserted in his letter to Raab.

This is a matter for Indians to decide. Indian kisans will do well to discourage solidarity from Khalistanis.

Newsdesk

Newsdesk

Aravind Rajeev is Deputy News Editor at Asian Lite, mostly covering the Middle East and GCC. He has over eight years of experience as a journalist, with a background in ground-level reporting, crime reporting, as well as international and regional news.

Previous Story

China urges US to resume dialogue

Next Story

No state of emergency in Cambodia

Previous Story

China urges US to resume dialogue

Next Story

No state of emergency in Cambodia

Latest from -Top News

Pakistan Risks Overstretching Itself in Yemen War

Pakistan’s expanding military role in Saudi Arabia amid the Yemen conflict could strain its defence resources and fragile finances…reports Asian Lite News Desk Pakistan’s military involvement in the war in Yemen may prove unsustainable because of mounting financial pressures and competing security demands, according to a new report. Islamabad’s growing military presence in Saudi Arabia risks stretching its defence resources while exposing the country to greater strategic and economic challenges. An article by Andrew Wilson in One World Outlook describes Pakistan’s involvement as a case of “fiscal and strategic overreach”, arguing that the country lacks the financial flexibility to sustain an expanded military commitment. Pakistan’s external finances depend heavily on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, financial support from Gulf countries and remittances from Pakistani workers in the region. The report argues that deeper military involvement in the conflict could place additional pressure on these sources of financial stability. It also warns that deploying troops and military equipment abroad could weaken Pakistan’s capacity to address security challenges along its eastern border and deal with two domestic insurgencies. The move could also draw Islamabad into a conflict it has sought to approach cautiously. A Reuters report in May, citing Pakistani security and government sources, said Islamabad had deployed around 8,000 troops, a squadron of approximately 16 aircraft, mostly JF-17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons and a Chinese HQ-9 air-defence battery to Saudi Arabia. According to those sources, Riyadh was financing the deployment, with Pakistani personnel operating the equipment. The sources also said a confidential agreement contemplated the possibility of deploying up to 80,000 troops. Islamabad has not confirmed those figures, although it has acknowledged its military presence in Saudi Arabia, including the deployment of fighter jets at King Abdulaziz Air Base from April. The One World Outlook article argues that Saudi financial support can cover allowances and operating expenses but cannot easily replace military equipment needed elsewhere or resolve the political and strategic challenges of participating in the Yemen conflict. Pakistan’s defence budget is another concern. For the 2026-27 financial year, the federal government allocated PKR 3 trillion, or approximately $10.8 billion, to defence services. The allocation represents an 18 per cent increase from the original PKR 2.55 trillion provision and amounts to around 2.1 per cent of projected gross domestic product (GDP). Defence spending accounts for approximately 16 per cent of the federal government’s PKR 18.8 trillion expenditure. Military pensions are budgeted separately at PKR 822 billion, while debt servicing costs stand at approximately PKR 8 trillion, more than two-and-a-half times the defence allocation. The report argues that these competing financial obligations leave little room for additional military expenditure without placing further pressure on public finances. Pakistan’s reliance on IMF assistance also limits its fiscal flexibility. The country must meet the conditions attached to the programme, including a primary budget surplus target of 2 per cent of GDP and continued restraint on development spending. According to the article, these requirements make it difficult for Islamabad to finance an additional military commitment without compromising other budgetary priorities. Pakistan’s economic indicators offer limited reassurance. Economic growth for the 2025-26 financial year is estimated at between 3.6 and 3.7 per cent, while inflation reached approximately 10.3 per cent in September following an energy price shock. Foreign exchange reserves stood at around $21.5 billion at the end of September. Although this marks an improvement from the low levels recorded in 2023, the report notes that the reserves cover only a few months of imports. Financial assistance from Gulf partners remains central to Pakistan’s external stability. The article says Islamabad holds approximately $8 billion in Saudi deposits at its central bank. In July, the State Bank of Pakistan said Riyadh had extended the maturity of $5 billion in deposits to December 2028, easing the country’s immediate external financing requirements. A further $3 billion deposit was also extended in the spring. However, the article argues that these arrangements provide temporary relief rather than long-term financial independence, particularly as regional conflict threatens the stability of the Gulf economies on which Pakistan relies. The report concludes that Pakistan faces a difficult balance between supporting Saudi Arabia militarily and preserving the financial and military resources needed to address its domestic and regional challenges.
Go toTop