The core problem is structural where military courts are executive‑controlled forums designed to enforce discipline within the armed forces, not to adjudicate civilian guilt and innocence under ordinary criminal law, writes Dr Sakariya Kareem
Pakistan’s military courts have become a central instrument for dealing with perceived threats to the security establishment, but their operation systematically undermines fair trial guarantees and civilian judicial authority. The renewed use of courtmartials against civilians after the 9 May 2023 protests, and the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision to reauthorise these trials, confirms a deeper militarisation.
The core problem is structural where military courts are executive‑controlled forums designed to enforce discipline within the armed forces, not to adjudicate civilian guilt and innocence under ordinary criminal law. Proceedings are secret, judges are serving officers, and defendants are denied basic safeguards such as public hearings, independent and impartial tribunals, and full access to counsel and evidence. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has repeatedly concluded that Pakistan’s military justice system is incompatible with fair administration of justice and breaches Article 14 ICCPR.
The May 9, 2023 protests sparked by the arrest of former Prime Minister Imran Khan provided the pretext for a new wave of military‑court use against civilians. Demonstrations turned violent, with attacks on GHQ Rawalpindi, the Lahore Corps Commander’s house and other military sites. In response, the army chief announced that alleged planners, abettors and perpetrators would be tried under the Pakistan Army Act 1952 and the Official Secrets Act 1923. More than 100 civilians accused of attacking military installations were removed from the ordinary court system and handed over to military jurisdiction, reigniting the long‑standing debate over whether civilians should ever face court‑martial.
In October 2023, a five‑judge bench of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down the ongoing military trials of 103 civilians and, by a 4–1 majority, held that section 2(1)(d) of the Army Act allowing civilians to be tried in military courts was unconstitutional. The Court ordered that all accused be tried in civilian courts under ordinary criminal law, and human‑rights groups hailed the decision as a historic affirmation of judicial independence and the right to a fair trial.
On 7 May 2025, a larger Supreme Court bench reversed course. In a 5–2 majority verdict, it overturned the earlier judgment, restored the contested Army Act provisions, and allowed civilians accused in the May 9 riots to be tried in military courts for offences targeting the armed forces and national security. The Court directed the government to legislate within 45 days to provide a right of appeal, but rights advocates noted that this did not cure the fundamental defects of secrecy, lack of independence and executive control characteristic of military justice.
The ICJ’s detailed analysis of these trials describes multiple due‑process violations. Defendants and their lawyers often lack access to charge sheets, evidence and judgments; proceedings are held in undisclosed locations; and families are denied information about hearing dates or outcomes until after sentences are handed down. Reports also point to the use of torture and ill‑treatment to extract confessions, as well as harassment of relatives attempting to attend proceedings or challenge convictions. In earlier waves of military‑court activity under Pakistan’s 2015–2019 constitutional amendments, at least eight civilians were executed following secret trials, prompting the ICJ to label these executions unlawful and in breach of both domestic law and international obligations. The current cycle risks repeating this pattern, now directed at a new political constituency.
Defenders of military trials argue that attacks on bases, monuments and sensitive installations threaten Pakistan’s stability and that ordinary courts are too slow, vulnerable to intimidation or incapable of handling complex security cases. They maintain that flexibility is needed in exceptional circumstances and that appeal rights or limited transparency reforms can mitigate concerns. But international standards are clear: the UN Human Rights Committee has repeatedly held that states should not try civilians before military courts, and if they do, only under narrowly defined, exceptional circumstances that still fully respect fair‑trial guarantees. Pakistan’s broad use of court‑martials for protest‑related offences fails this test.
The political context reinforces the sense that military courts are being used as a tool of repression rather than neutral justice. Those targeted for May 9‑related trials are overwhelmingly supporters of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek‑e‑Insaf (PTI), a party already facing mass arrests, electoral engineering and media blackouts. PTI has condemned the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision, arguing that military justice is being weaponised to crush opposition and deter any future challenge to army dominance. Civil‑society groups warn that normalising military jurisdiction over civilians creates a template that could be extended to Baloch, Pashtun and other dissenters under the banner of national security.
Pakistan stands at a judicial crossroads. By entrenching the role of military courts in handling civilian dissent, it risks further eroding public trust in the rule of law and deepening the perception that the military sits above constitutional constraints. Restoring the primacy of civilian courts, abolishing military jurisdiction over civilians, and ensuring that all protest‑related cases are heard in open, independent forums would be essential steps toward aligning practice with Pakistan’s constitutional promises and its international human‑rights obligations.
