July 24, 2023
6 mins read

Qin’s absence may reflect Xi’s weakening grip on CCP

Has the disappearance of Qin taken place not because of Xi’s orders but in spite of them? Has Qin Gang become the ‘chicken’ that is being removed to scare the ‘farmer’, Xi himself? … writes Prof. Madhav Das Nalapat

The absence from the public eye for almost a month of Foreign Minister Qin Gang of the People’s Republic of China has given rise to speculation that he has been cashiered for having an extra-marital relationship with a Chinese television anchor who often travelled abroad. Other theories mention the possibility of blackmail of the Foreign Minister by a “hostile power” i.e. the United States. A third claims that the fast-promoted Qin has fallen foul of CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The degree of opacity in the higher circles of the CCP resembles a bottle of black ink, hence such theories remain just that, hypotheses as to why Qin has been missing for almost a month.

That he has landed in disgrace because of a romantic liaison with an attractive television presenter is contrary to the fact that this relationship almost since it began must have been well known to not just the CCP General Secretary, but to lesser authorities as well. As envoy to the US, he would have been under 24/7 surveillance, and knowledge of any love affair, assuming that he had one, would have been known to CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The fact is that in less than 18 months, Qin was promoted from envoy to the US to being the Foreign Minister of China. The missing diplomat is part of the relatively younger group (most in their 40s or 50s) that has been collected around him by Xi Jinping.

Qin Gang and Antony Blinke

Each member of this inner circle of the CCP Supremo would be aware not just that his (there would probably not be a woman within the group) swift ascent was because of Xi’s patronage, but that were Xi Jinping to fall, not just the job but very likely the freedom and maybe in some cases the life of the Xi acolyte would immediately be severely impacted. That Qin Gang became a hidden dissident while he was within the trusted inner circle of assistants of Xi is implausible. Only a confirmed loyalist of Xi would have been sent to the most sensitive posting outside China for any PRC diplomat, the PRC embassy in Washington.

As for the young lady, had she been regarded as even a bit unreliable from the regime’s point of view, she would not have been made an important news anchor by Phoenix television. Phoenix, although technically not state-controlled, is in effect very much a part of the Agitation & Propaganda wing of the CCP’s United Front. Just as in the case of Qin, the presumed lady friend’s loyalty to the regime would have been examined under a microscope and judged to be fool-proof.

Were there any doubts about her reliability, Qin Gang’s rumoured affair with the anchor would have speedily ended with her being sent out in disgrace, and at the least an admonition to Qin to stay away from anyone less than fully reliable as a regime supporter.

Did the Chinese FM reveal “secrets” to the anchor? Under Xi Jinping, the level of secrecy expected by those in the inner circle is even more than was ever the case earlier. Anything personal about Xi Jinping, for example, would be out of bounds to reveal to anyone, even what the General Secretary had for breakfast. Did Qin Gang break the 24/7 Code of Omerta (silence and secrecy) expected of him by just revealing not matters of state, but personal matters relating to the uppermost levels of the CCP? We do not know, and probably never will. As for falling prey to CIA lures, that again appears improbable, as only an individual of tested loyalty would have been sent to Washington and later given what may be the swiftest promotion in the Chinese diplomatic service, made Foreign Minister.

What then? It may be remembered that from mid-2022 onwards, the present writer was mentioning reports reaching him from Moscow about a weakening of the hold of President Putin within the Kremlin as a consequence of the way the Ukraine war was developing. Recent events have shown that to be very likely a reality.

Till now, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has wielded power within the country and the party on the level of Stalin or Mao. As a result, there has been concealed discontent about his absolutist ways. Have the seniors within the CCP core who dislike such a return to absolutism become strong enough to “kill the chicken to scare the farmer”? Has the disappearance of Qin taken place not because of Xi’s orders but in spite of them? Has Qin Gang become the “chicken” that is being removed to scare the “farmer”, Xi himself? To show him that unless he returns from Mao’s ways to that of the Great Helmsman’s successors until Xi took over in 2012? If Qin Gang has truly been disgraced, that may be an indication that Xi’s absolute grip on the CCP is under challenge.

Xi’s loyalists from Fujian and Zhejiang factions take charge of China’s national security

That he can no longer ignore and humiliate seniors in the way he has been doing since taking charge. The days ahead will show whether the fortunes of Foreign Minister Qin have plummeted or not. If they have, then even if outward appearances are to the contrary, it may be the first visible evidence that the hold of Xi is weakening, else a tested Xi loyalist such as Qin would not have been dealt with in the way he appears to have been. Of course, China being Communist China, it may be that it was indeed a heart attack that has taken Qin away from his jobs and not the work of a cabal engaged in resistance to Xi’s Mao-style grip over the CCP.

Given the unexpectedly robust coming together by countries such as those in the Quad as a reaction to Xi’s expansionist ways and the fall in PRC economic performance, given the possibility of supply sources and markets shrinking, not to mention the turmoil caused by Xi’s Zero Covid policy resistance to the top leader within the upper echelons of the CCP cannot any more be dismissed as impossible. If such be the case, Qin Gang may be the first high-level victim of a purge of Xi loyalists within the governance structure of the PRC.

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Pakistan Risks Overstretching Itself in Yemen War

Pakistan’s expanding military role in Saudi Arabia amid the Yemen conflict could strain its defence resources and fragile finances…reports Asian Lite News Desk Pakistan’s military involvement in the war in Yemen may prove unsustainable because of mounting financial pressures and competing security demands, according to a new report. Islamabad’s growing military presence in Saudi Arabia risks stretching its defence resources while exposing the country to greater strategic and economic challenges. An article by Andrew Wilson in One World Outlook describes Pakistan’s involvement as a case of “fiscal and strategic overreach”, arguing that the country lacks the financial flexibility to sustain an expanded military commitment. Pakistan’s external finances depend heavily on an International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, financial support from Gulf countries and remittances from Pakistani workers in the region. The report argues that deeper military involvement in the conflict could place additional pressure on these sources of financial stability. It also warns that deploying troops and military equipment abroad could weaken Pakistan’s capacity to address security challenges along its eastern border and deal with two domestic insurgencies. The move could also draw Islamabad into a conflict it has sought to approach cautiously. A Reuters report in May, citing Pakistani security and government sources, said Islamabad had deployed around 8,000 troops, a squadron of approximately 16 aircraft, mostly JF-17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons and a Chinese HQ-9 air-defence battery to Saudi Arabia. According to those sources, Riyadh was financing the deployment, with Pakistani personnel operating the equipment. The sources also said a confidential agreement contemplated the possibility of deploying up to 80,000 troops. Islamabad has not confirmed those figures, although it has acknowledged its military presence in Saudi Arabia, including the deployment of fighter jets at King Abdulaziz Air Base from April. The One World Outlook article argues that Saudi financial support can cover allowances and operating expenses but cannot easily replace military equipment needed elsewhere or resolve the political and strategic challenges of participating in the Yemen conflict. Pakistan’s defence budget is another concern. For the 2026-27 financial year, the federal government allocated PKR 3 trillion, or approximately $10.8 billion, to defence services. The allocation represents an 18 per cent increase from the original PKR 2.55 trillion provision and amounts to around 2.1 per cent of projected gross domestic product (GDP). Defence spending accounts for approximately 16 per cent of the federal government’s PKR 18.8 trillion expenditure. Military pensions are budgeted separately at PKR 822 billion, while debt servicing costs stand at approximately PKR 8 trillion, more than two-and-a-half times the defence allocation. The report argues that these competing financial obligations leave little room for additional military expenditure without placing further pressure on public finances. Pakistan’s reliance on IMF assistance also limits its fiscal flexibility. The country must meet the conditions attached to the programme, including a primary budget surplus target of 2 per cent of GDP and continued restraint on development spending. According to the article, these requirements make it difficult for Islamabad to finance an additional military commitment without compromising other budgetary priorities. Pakistan’s economic indicators offer limited reassurance. Economic growth for the 2025-26 financial year is estimated at between 3.6 and 3.7 per cent, while inflation reached approximately 10.3 per cent in September following an energy price shock. Foreign exchange reserves stood at around $21.5 billion at the end of September. Although this marks an improvement from the low levels recorded in 2023, the report notes that the reserves cover only a few months of imports. Financial assistance from Gulf partners remains central to Pakistan’s external stability. The article says Islamabad holds approximately $8 billion in Saudi deposits at its central bank. In July, the State Bank of Pakistan said Riyadh had extended the maturity of $5 billion in deposits to December 2028, easing the country’s immediate external financing requirements. A further $3 billion deposit was also extended in the spring. However, the article argues that these arrangements provide temporary relief rather than long-term financial independence, particularly as regional conflict threatens the stability of the Gulf economies on which Pakistan relies. The report concludes that Pakistan faces a difficult balance between supporting Saudi Arabia militarily and preserving the financial and military resources needed to address its domestic and regional challenges.
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